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Welcome to the Digital Age: Reinventing Contact
Tracing and the Public Health Service Act for a
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Michael L. Cederblom*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Contact tracing—the process of identifying and notifying close contacts
of possible exposure to a communicable disease—has a troubled history in
the United States.1 Despite this, the U.S. has successfully relied on
conventional contact tracing during past outbreaks of infectious diseases.2 In
fact, the U.S. was ranked as the overall best-prepared country in the world in
terms of “health security” in 2019.3 Among the six factors evaluated in the
Global Health Security Index, the U.S. ranked first and second overall for
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1
Cynthia Weiss, Mayo Clinic Q&A: COVID-19 and Contact Tracing, MAYO CLINIC (Nov.
16, 2020), https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/discussion/mayo-clinic-q-and-a-covid-19and-contact-tracing/ (describing the importance of contact tracing generally, noting that
contact tracing is the “process of identifying those who may have been exposed to someone
with a virus” and helps professionals assess the risk of exposure); see also Amy Lauren
Fairchild et al., Contact Tracing’s Long, Turbulent History Holds Lessons for COVID-19,
OHIO ST. NEWS (July 20, 2020), https://news.osu.edu/contact-tracings-long-turbulenthistory-holds-lessons-for-covid-19/ (discussing history of contact tracing in the United
States and how the fear of a personal privacy breach is making the need for contact tracing
during COVID-19 increasingly difficult).
2
See e.g., Melanie M. Taylor, et al., COVID-19 Contact Tracing as an Enduring Important
Public Health Tool, 2 JAMA HEALTH FORUM 1, 1 (Mar. 03, 2021) (“[Contact tracing] and
isolation of each new case and quarantine of any contacts who are potentially infected were
key interventions that effectively limited secondary transmission resulting from the
importation of Ebola virus to the US in 2014.”).
3
Building Collective Action and Accountability, GLOBAL HEALTH SEC. INDEX 5, 20 (Oct.
2019), https://www.ghsindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2019-Global-Health-SecurityIndex.pdf.
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“rapid response to” and “mitigation of the spread of an epidemic” in
comparison to 194 other countries across the world.4
This ranking seemed well-founded given the country’s experience
combating past infectious disease outbreaks.5 The SARS outbreak in 2003
infected eight U.S. citizens and caused zero deaths.6 The impact of the
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) outbreak was similarly anemic,
with two confirmed cases and zero deaths reported.7 Following suit, the
Ebola outbreak resulted in eleven U.S. citizens being treated for Ebola Virus
Disease (EVD) and one fatality.8 Despite this seemingly golden track record,
the initial U.S. response to the novel coronavirus was, for lack of a better
term, abysmal.9

4
See id. at 12, 20–21 (“The U.S. ranked first in “early detection & reporting for epidemics
of potential international concern” and “sufficient & robust health system to treat the sick &
protect health workers” as well. Meanwhile, South Korea’s highest-ranked category was
only fifth for early detection and sixth for rapid response & mitigation. The report still
suggests that “[n]o country [was] fully prepared for epidemics or pandemics, and every
country has important gaps to address.”).
5
See Mark Johnson, The U.S. Was the World’s Best Prepared Nation to Confront a
Pandemic. How Did It Spiral to ‘Almost Inconceivable’ Failure?, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL
(Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.jsonline.com/in-depth/news/2020/10/14/america-had-worldsbest-pandemic-response-plan-playbook-why-did-fail-coronavirus-covid-19timeline/3587922001/ (explaining how the United States was thought to be the most
prepared out of any country for a pandemic, but failed due to “America’s lethargic and
inconsistent response” and due to serious lapses in addressing the pandemic); see also
Catharine I. Paules et al., What Recent History Has Taught Us About Responding to
Emerging Infectious Disease Threats, 167 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 805, 810 (Dec. 07, 2017)
(“Leadership at the NIAID has learned many valuable lessons through experiences . . . with
regard to optimal responses to such outbreaks.”).
6
Frequently Asked Questions About SARS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/sars/about/faq.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
7
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/mers/faq.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2021); MERS in the U.S,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/mers/us.html
(last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
8
2014-2016 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html (last updated Mar. 8,
2019).
9
SARS, MERS, and Ebola were chosen for this comparison to the COVID-19 outbreak due
to their relatively high death rate compared to other outbreaks such as the H1N1 pandemic.
While the swine flu is estimated to have killed between 150,000 and 575,000 people
worldwide, it infected over one point four billion people. See Kimberly Hickok, How Does
the COVID-19 Pandemic Compare to the Last Pandemic?, LIVESCIENCE (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.livescience.com/covid-19-pandemic-vs-swine-flu.html; see also Philip A.
Wallach & Justus Myers, The Federal Government’s Coronavirus Response—Public Health
Timeline, BROOKINGS (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-federalgovernments-coronavirus-actions-and-failures-timeline-and-themes/ (“By now, it is obvious
. . . that there were massive failures of judgment and inaction . . . . [and] our federal
government’s response compares unfavorably . . . [to] other countries.”).
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On December 31, 2019, Chinese officials informed the World Health
Organization (WHO) of several cases of pneumonia “from an unknown
source” in Wuhan, China.10 Eleven days later, Chinese officials reported the
first death from a novel coronavirus.11 This novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV2, causes the disease now dubbed COVID-19.12 While the actual date the
novel coronavirus arrived in the U.S. is currently unknown,13 what is thought
to be the first confirmed case was detected in Washington State on January
20, 2020.14 In response, the U.S. federal government, under the Trump
administration, created varying travel restrictions, released voluntary
guidelines for social distancing and face coverings, and passed legislation
designed to protect and bolster the economy.15
The Trump administration often praised the U.S. response to the
pandemic.16 However, the onslaught of cases and casualties rightfully
10

See Erin Schumaker, Mysterious Pneumonia Outbreak Sickens Dozens in China, ABC
NEWS (Jan. 6, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/mystery-pneumonia-outbreak-sickensdozens-china/story?id=68094861 (discussing how the Wuhan Health Commission ruled out
other infectious diseases such as SARS, MERS, and influenza as the cause of the mysterious
pneumonia cases).
11
Zaheer Allam, The First 50 Days of COVID-19: A Detailed Chronological Timeline and
Extensive Review of Literature Documenting the Pandemic, SURVEYING THE COVID-19
PANDEMIC AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 1, 2-3 (Jul. 24, 2020).
12
Naming the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the Virus that Causes It, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technicalguidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it (last
visited Oct. 7, 2021). Since the start of the pandemic, the delta variant has emerged as the
dominant strain of the coronavirus. It is currently, as of this writing, responsible for the most
infections in the U.S. and even causes breakthrough infections in vaccinated individuals; see
also Kathy Katella, 5 Things to Know About the Delta Variant, YALE MED. (Nov. 03, 2021),
https://www.yalemedicine.org/news/5-things-to-know-delta-variant-covid.
13
Mike Baker, When Did the Coronavirus Arrive in the U.S.? Here’s a Review of the
Evidence., N.Y. TIMES (last updated June 1, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/us/coronavirus-first-case-snohomish-antibodies.html.
14
Grace Hauck, The First US Case. The First Death. The First Outbreak at a Nursing
Home., USA TODAY (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/indepth/news/nation/2021/01/19/first-covid-case-us-year-anniversary-snohomishcounty/4154942001/.
15
See generally Nick Schwellenbach, The First 100 Days of the U.S. Government’s COVID19 Response, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (May 6, 2020),
https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/05/the-first-100-days-of-the-u-s-governments-covid-19response/ (describing the travel restrictions and notices on China, South Korea, and Italy,
among other countries; the federal government’s hesitancy to release social distancing
guidelines; and federal legislation such as the CARES Act).
16
See Jon Greenberg et al., Pence Praises Trump’s ‘Seamless’ COVID Response, Leaves out
his State Feuds, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 27, 2020), https://khn.org/news/pence-praises-
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undermined the administration’s messaging.17 By January 2021, roughly one
year after the first confirmed case, the U.S. reported a total of nearly
21,500,000 confirmed cases and approximately 363,000 deaths associated
with COVID-19—the most in the world in both categories.18 With results
that would suggest an apparent failure to contain the outbreak, the
administration’s self-touting seems misplaced, if not outright dishonest.19

trumps-seamless-covid-response-leaves-out-his-state-feuds/ (describing and noting instances
where the administration did not provide centralized coordination in the response to the
pandemic); see also Benjamin Siegel et al., Trump says US Efforts ‘Working Very Well’ as
Coronavirus Death Trends Continue Upward, ABC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2020),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-us-efforts-working-coronavirus-death-trendscontinue/story?id=72172556 (reviewing statements of the administration which praise their
response efforts despite rising numbers of fatalities and limited supplies); see also Quint
Forgey, ‘Maybe Our Best Work’: Trump Praises His Coronavirus Response, POLITICO (May
6, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/06/trump-praises-his-coronavirusresponse-239787 (examining the Trump administration’s support of various coronavirus
response efforts in light of the upcoming 2020 election).
17
See Daniel Funke & Katie Sanders, Lie of the Year: The Downplay and Denial of the
Coronavirus, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://khn.org/news/article/lie-of-theyear-the-downplay-and-denial-of-the-coronavirus/ (discussing how the Trump
administration, along with numerous other online skeptics, “fueled conspiracy and
confusion” about the deadliness and seriousness of COVID-19. In the United States, the
virus has killed an exorbitant amount of people which was “exacerbated by the reckless
spread of falsehoods”).
18
See Coronavirus Map: Tracking the Global Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/world/coronavirus-maps.html (last visited Oct. 7,
2021) [hereinafter Coronavirus Map] (showing the global numbers of daily cases and
deaths, along with overall numbers from COVID-19; this website is constantly updated to
show new and most accurate data). It is important to note that for certain countries, the
reported deaths may be significantly underreported. For example, it is thought that India’s
numbers are being heavily underreported. This was true before and during the pandemic.
This can be partially explained by the fact that most deaths in the country are not registered
and that many are not medically certified. Rukmini S., How India Could Fill in the Blanks
on Excess Mortality, INDIASPEND (June 17, 2020), https://www.indiaspend.com/how-indiacould-fill-in-the-blanks-on-excess-mortality/.
19
Richard Wike et al., U.S. Image Plummets Internationally as Most Say Country Has
Handled Coronavirus Badly, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sep. 15, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/09/15/us-image-plummets-internationally-asmost-say-country-has-handled-coronavirus-badly/ (“Across the 13 nations surveyed, a
median of just 15% say the U.S. has done a good job dealing with the outbreak.”); compare
Andrew Solender, Trump Says His Only Failure in ‘Phenomenal’ Coronavirus Response
Was ‘Public Relations’, FORBES (Sep. 17, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewsolender/2020/09/17/trump-says-his-only-failure-inphenomenal-coronavirus-response-was-public-relations/#5df5caef1d59 (highlighting the fact
that the Trump administration might be dishonest with itself, and Trump believes that his
response to COVID-19 has been “phenomenal...despite overwhelming public sentiment to
the contrary.”).
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The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) identified contact
tracing as “key to slowing the spread of COVID-19.”20 However, Dr.
Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases, expressed that contact tracing in the United States was “not
working.”21 During the beginning stages of the pandemic, there was no
unified federal action or comprehensive national guidance plan.22 Thus,
necessary responses, such as contact tracing, were left to the states.23 Given
the failure to respond properly to the COVID-19 pandemic,24 the federal
government must begin preparing for the future. The next pandemic will not

20

See Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Contact Tracing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-lifecoping/contact-tracing.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2021); see also Michael Fraser et al., A
Coordinated, National Approach to Scaling Public Health Capacity for Contact Tracing and
Disease Investigation, ASS’N STATE & TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFS. 1, 3 (2020),
https://www.astho.org/COVID-19/A-National-Approach-for-Contact-Tracing/ (calling for
“rapid and massive scaling up of existing contact investigation resources in every
community in the United States and its territories” to amass at least 100,000 contact
investigators needed to address the current situation).
21
Bryan Walsh, Why Coronavirus Contact Tracing Is Failing, AXIOS (June 27, 2020),
https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-contact-tracing-isnt-working-0d8ec92c-ec1c-4b46a736-844649b760dd.html.
22
See Ken Dilanian & Dan De Luce, Trump Administration’s Lack of a Unified Coronavirus
Strategy Will Cost Lives, Say a Dozen Experts, NBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2020, 4:01 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-administration-s-lack-unifiedcoronavirus-strategy-will-cost-lives-n1175126 (discussing lack of national strategy to
COVID-19 outbreak under Trump Administration).
23
See Benjamin Lesser et al., Special Report: Local Governments ‘Overwhelmed’ In Race to
Trace U.S. COVID Contacts, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2020, 6:16 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-tracing-specialrep/special-reportlocal-governments-overwhelmed-in-race-to-trace-u-s-covid-contacts-idUSKCN2501GK
(discussing how the lack of federal strategy and funding has overwhelmed state and local
governments’ contact tracing efforts).
24
See Kevin Kunzmann, The 4 Ways the United States Failed in COVID-19 Response,
CONTAGIONLIVE (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.contagionlive.com/view/the-4-ways-theunited-states-failed-in-covid19-response (summarizing virologist’s explanations for why
U.S. COVID-19 response lagged behind other industrialized nations).
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wait for fifty individual systems of pandemic response to coordinate on their
own.25 The U.S. must remedy its patchwork response.26
To improve contact tracing and future pandemic preparedness more
broadly, the U.S. should look to countries that more successfully contained
the spread of COVID-19. South Korea was one of the world’s most
successful countries in stopping the initial spread of the pandemic.27 The
South Korean response included a centralized contact tracing program using
citizen location data.28 Other countries that successfully slowed the spread
of COVID-19, such as China, also used private technology platforms to
25

See Michael Dulaney, The Next Pandemic Is Coming – And Sooner Than We Think,
Thanks to Changes to the Environment, ABC NEWS (June 6, 2020, 2:00 PM),
https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2020-06-07/a-matter-of-when-not-if-the-nextpandemic-is-around-the-corner/12313372 (discussing how increased human intervention in
nature exacerbates the likelihood of new infectious diseases to emerge via zoonotic transfer).
The surge of cases attributed to the delta variant highlights the continued importance of
mitigation measures – vaccination alone will not suffice where breakthrough infections exist,
there is uneven access to vaccinations, and existing mitigations are relaxed. See Christie
Aschwanden, Five Reasons Why COVID Herd Immunity is Probably Impossible, NATURE
(Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00728-2 (explaining how
pockets of unequal access to vaccinations can result in the “potential for new outbreaks”);
Stephen Loiconi, ‘Delta Is A New Game’: Breakthrough Infections Still Rare, But Experts
Urge Caution, ABC13 NEWS (Aug. 2, 2021), https://wset.com/news/coronavirus/delta-is-anew-game-breakthrough-infections-still-rare-but-experts-urge-caution (explaining how
despite the “relative rarity” of breakthrough infections, “federal officials and public health
experts say recent evidence still supports reviving some mitigation measures.”).
26
See Ed Yong, America’s Patchwork Pandemic is Fraying Even Further, ATLANTIC (May
20, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/05/patchwork-pandemic-statesreopening-inequalities/611866/ (characterizing US response to COVID-19 outbreak as a
series of decentralized state and local government interventions); see also Noah HigginsDunn & Will Feuer, This is What Top U.S. Health Officials Say We Should Do Differently
for the Next Pandemic, CNBC (June 30, 2020, 4:33 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/30/this-is-what-top-us-health-officials-say-we-should-dodifferently-for-the-next-pandemic.html (reporting US health officials’ statements from
Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pension Committee hearing that increased
coordination, funding, and public health infrastructure would improve US response to future
pandemics).
27
See Jason Beaubien, How South Korea Reigned in the Outbreak Without Shutting
Everything Down, NPR (Mar. 26, 2020, 2:41 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/03/26/821688981/how-south-koreareigned-in-the-outbreak-without-shutting-everything-down (discussing measures South
Korea implemented to slowdown the number of new coronavirus cases without closing
public places like schools).
28
See Keren Landman, What We Can Learn From South Korea’s Coronavirus Response,
ELEMENTAL (June 1, 2020), https://elemental.medium.com/what-we-can-learn-from-southkoreas-coronavirus-response-97a4db5c9fef (identifying widespread data collection from
private companies, including GPS data, as key to South Korean COVID-19 contract tracing
response); see also Seung-Youn Oh, South Korea’s Success Against COVID-19, REG. REV.:
OP. (May 14, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/05/14/oh-south-korea-successagainst-covid-19/ (describing changes to South Korean laws after 2015 MERS outbreak
which allow authorities to access citizens’ private data in public health emergency).
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supplement contact tracing.29 However, South Korea’s system was legally
authorized, transparent, and limited how location data was used to support
necessary contact tracing efforts, and therefore is the best model to inform
future U.S. preparedness.30
While the U.S. also implemented contact tracing, the fragmented effort led
by the states was insufficient, ineffective, and resulted in a catastrophic loss
of life and sweeping economic damage.31 The interpretation and precedent
of current federal laws and powers surrounding public health leave the U.S.
ill-equipped to respond to future pandemics, as evidenced by the failed
federal response to the COVID-19 pandemic.32
As one of many necessary steps to improve U.S. pandemic response, this
article proposes an amendment to existing U.S legislation that would enable
the creation of a centralized system designed to support state digital contact
tracing efforts. Part II of this article will provide an overview of the current
laws dedicated towards federal pandemic response and the actions taken by
the U.S. federal government during the COVID-19 pandemic. Part III will
discuss the origin of SARS-CoV-2 in China and the Chinese government’s
29

China collected citizens’ digital footprints, including location data, to issue “health codes”
for contact tracing in “Alipay,” a popular app. See generally Josh Ye et al., Governments
Worldwide Navigate Privacy Versus Urgency in Fight Against COVID-19, POLITICO (June 8,
2020, 8:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/08/government-privacycoronavirus-china-308105; see also Mary Van Beusekom, Study: Contact Tracing Slowed
COVID-19 Spread in China, UNIV. MINN. CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL’Y (Apr.
28, 2020), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/04/study-contact-tracingslowed-covid-19-spread-china (highlighting the increased attention given to the use of
technology in contact tracing, and related results of long-term use of technology-based
measures).
30
Oh, supra note 28 (analyzing the changes between South Korea’s response to the MERS
outbreak and the COVID-19 outbreak regarding data).
31
See Olga Khazan, The Most American COVID-19 Failure Yet: Contact Tracing Works
Almost Everywhere Else. Why Not Here?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/08/contact-tracing-hr-6666-workingus/615637/ (identifying pitfalls of US contact tracing systems as capacity and funding
limitations, testing duration, and public mistrust in government); see also Coronavirus Map,
supra note 18; see also Jeff Cox, Second-Quarter GDP Plunged By Worst-Ever 32.9% Amid
Virus-Induced Shutdown, CNBC (July 30, 2020, 8:31 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/30/us-gdp-q2-2020-first-reading.html (“The U.S. economy
suffered its worst period ever in the second quarter, with GDP falling a historic 32.9%.”).
32
William A. Haseltine, Restructuring the Federal Response to a Pandemic, FORBES (Oct.
26, 2020, 1:22 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhaseltine/2020/10/26/restructuring-the-federalresponse-to-a-pandemic/?sh=28e51ebd5c50 (discussing the impact of state power over
public health as opposed to federal authority, and discussing the need for increased federal
leadership, governance of public health policies, continued research, and social solidarity).
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response and contact tracing efforts. Part IV will review South Korea’s
response to the COVID-19 pandemic and their contact tracing system.
Finally, Part V will propose an amendment to the Public Health Service Act
giving the U.S. federal government the power to collect and distribute citizen
location data for a centralized contact tracing support system during
outbreaks of infectious diseases like COVID-19.
II. INABILITY BEGETS INACTION: A STORY OF AMERICAN MEDIOCRITY
For diseases other than influenza, federal plans for pandemic response
were lacking when the COVID-19 pandemic began.33 The influenza response
plan created by the Bush administration in 2005 was the most comprehensive
pandemic response plan in the U.S. and was generally applicable to other
disease outbreaks.34 According to this federal plan, the HHS is responsible
for assisting state efforts during public health crises.35 Additionally, the plan
makes clear that the federal government is to provide states with guidance
regarding measures designed to contain viral spread.36 In short, the HHS’s
role is one of support. The 2005 plan mentioned contact tracing once as a
means of deterring the initial introduction of a pandemic-level influenza into
the country, rather than as an ongoing measure of spread prevention.37 The
2017 update continued to undervalue the importance of contact tracing,
mentioning it once in the context of tracing passengers of planes and ships.38
Although the HHS maintained a supervisory role in the 2017 update, states
fell further and further behind in contact tracing as coronavirus cases moved
33
See Diane Meyer, Federal Pandemic Response Plans, LADEX (April 27, 2018),
https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/ourwork/events/2018_clade_x_exercise/pdfs/Clade-X-federal-pandemic-response-plans.pdf
(discussing the lack of federal pandemic response plans for diseases other than influenza,
and the lack of a plan to identify and act “against a novel pathogen”).
34
See Barbara McQuade, Bush Devised a Plan for Pandemics like the Coronavirus. Trump
Is Ignoring It, USA TODAY (last updated Apr. 6, 2020, 11:20 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/04/06/coronavirus-donald-trump-ignores2005-bush-pandemic-plan-column/2950848001/ (identifying George W. Bush’s 2005
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza as roadmap for COVID-19 pandemic response,
and recommending that the Trump administration 1) provide resources to heavily-impacted
areas, 2) provide technical assistance to state and local governments, and 3) communicate
with the public to reduce exposure).
35
Pandemic Influenza Plan: 2017 Update, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 19 (2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pan-flu-report-2017v2.pdf.
36
See id. (discussing federal government objectives through HHS and other agencies to
provide guidance on pandemic related factors).
37
U.S. Homeland Sec. Council, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, 7 (Nov. 1, 2005),
available at https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-strategy2005.pdf.
38
Pandemic Influenza Plan: 2017 Update, supra note 35 (“Procedures are in place for
conducting contact investigations among passengers and crews of aircraft and cruise ships,
scalable by disease and situation.”).
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to form another peak at the end of 2020,39 and these efforts were severely
underfunded.40
A. U.S. Federal Law Governing Infectious Disease Outbreak Response
Under existing federal law at the time of this writing, the HHS had
delegated authority to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
to implement measures designed to prevent the spread of communicable
diseases.41 The basis of the HHS’s power comes from 42 U.S.C. § 264, the
Public Health Service Act,42 and 42 C.F.R. §§ 70 and 71 provide specific
delegations of power to the CDC.43 These provisions allow the CDC to
isolate and quarantine individuals to prevent the spread of specific infectious
diseases between states.44 In 2014, former President Barack Obama signed
Executive Order No. 13674, adding severe acute respiratory syndromes, such
as SARS-CoV-2, to the list of communicable diseases for which the CDC

39
See Stephanie Soucheray, COVID-19 Rising in 26 States as U.S. Hits 6 Million Cases,
UNIV. MINN. CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL’Y (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/08/covid-19-rising-26-states-us-hits-6million-cases (detailing several states that reported record highs for weekly COVID-19 cases
in August of 2020).
40
See Elizabeth Hlavinka, Distrust, Underfunding Hinders COVID-19 Contact Tracing,
MEDPAGE TODAY (July 7, 2020),
https://www.medpagetoday.com/infectiousdisease/covid19/87443 (describing pervasive
reasons behind the United States’ flagging efforts to contact trace COVID-19 exposures);
see also Lois Parshley, The Magnitude of America’s Contact Tracing Crisis is Hard to
Overstate, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Sep. 1, 2020),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/09/contact-tracing-crisis-magnitude-hotmess-america-fixes-coronavirus-cvd/. See Danielle Allen, et al., Roadmap To Pandemic
Resilience, EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR ETHICS HARV. UNIV. (Apr. 20, 2020) (supporting the
recommendation from Johns Hopkins University for a $3.6 billion investment in hiring and
training of 100,000 new contact tracing personnel); see also CRYSTAL WATSON, ET AL. FOR
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., A NATIONAL PLAN TO ENABLE COMPREHENSIVE COVID-19 CASE
FINDING AND CONTACT TRACING IN THE US 3 (Apr. 10, 2020) (finding that nationally,
funding allocated for contact tracing was insufficient and suggesting that around three and a
half billion dollars was needed to fund the minimum necessary contact tracing efforts
nationwide).
41
Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (“CDC”) (Aug. 12, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html.
42
Id.; see also Public Health Service Act § 361, 42 U.S.C. § 264.
43
Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, supra note 41; see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 70,
71.
44
Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, supra note 41.
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can implement federal isolation and quarantine.45 Isolation and quarantine
may be imposed on individuals infected with a communicable disease and
those who are a “probable source of infection to individuals” who may move
between states.46
There is limited interpretation to the meaning and breadth of these powers,
the most notable quarantine case arising from the Ebola crisis.47 In Hickox v.
Christie, a nurse returning to the U.S. from Sierra Leone, where she provided
care to those infected with Ebola, was required by state law to quarantine for
eighty hours.48 The District Court in Hickox recognized the CDC’s authority
to forcibly quarantine persons “traveling between states who are suspected
of carrying these communicable diseases,” even noting the relative rarity of
this use of power, and affirmed their authority to force a quarantine.49
However, this is the extent of the court’s interpretation of the statute, merely
confirming its basic assertions.50 Instead, the court noted that the CDC has
typically taken a “supportive role,” leaving quarantine efforts mostly to the
States.51 As such, the court proceeded to assess the legality of the state
quarantine order, leaving the CDC’s authority under the Public Health
Service Act relatively untouched and unquestioned.52
Even so, Hickox was decided before what some considered to be a ‘drastic’
expansion of the CDC’s quarantine powers in 2017.53 At the time, CDC
quarantines appeared to be heavily restricted to interstate travel, affecting
either those entering or exiting the country or those actually moving between
states.54 Further, the CDC was siloed into a pure advisory position unless
explicitly invited to take charge by relevant state and local authorities, or
society had broken down to the point where the Insurrection Act would be
triggered.55 Yet, some suspected that the CDC relished this limited power
45
Exec. Order No. 13674, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,671 (July 31, 2014); see also What Diseases Are
Subject to Federal Isolation and Quarantine Law?, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/answers/public-health-and-safety/what-diseases-are-subject-to-federalisolation-and-quarantine-law/index.html (last reviewed on March 27, 2020).
46
42 U.S.C. § 264(d) (2011).
47
See Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D.N.J. 2016) (ruling that a nurse’s
Constitutional rights were not violated by requiring an eighty-hour quarantine upon her
return from treating Ebola patients in Africa).
48
Id. at 584.
49
Id. at 590.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 590–91.
52
Id. at 591.
53
Rob Stein, CDC Seeks Controversial New Quarantine Powers to Stop Outbreaks, NPR
(Feb. 2, 2017, 4:47 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2017/02/02/512678115/cdc-seeks-controversial-new-quarantine-powers-to-stopoutbreaks (describing the expansion of federal quarantine powers).
54
Denver Nicks, The CDC Has Less Power Than You Think, and Likes It That Way, TIME
(Oct. 17, 2014, 1:12 PM), https://time.com/3516827/cdc-constitution-quarantine/.
55
Id.
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since quarantines are inherently coercive, and public health necessarily relies
on a degree of voluntary compliance56—unfettered wielding of this power
could be counterintuitive to disease spread prevention.
In 2017, the CDC’s powers were modernized and greatly expanded.57
Now the agency could “detain people anywhere in the country without
getting approval from state and local officials.”58 This necessarily increased
the number of people that could fall under the scope of public health
quarantines.59 Critics raised concerns of threats to civil liberties, the
possibility of action motivated by politics over science, and the risk that
people may attempt to hide their illnesses to avoid federal detainment.60 Yet,
the regulations suggest that from a policy perspective, increased power to
protect public health during a crisis is of the utmost importance.61 However,
for a time, the District Court’s finding in Hickox that the CDC hardly

56

Id.
Stein, supra note 53; Control of Communicable Diseases, 82 Fed. Reg. 6890-01 (Jan. 19,
2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 70 & 71).
58
Stein, supra note 53.
59
Id.
60
See id. While critics were correct in their concern of the Trump Administration wielding
public health for political reasons, they incorrectly assumed these new powers may lead to
an increase in utilization; see also id. (“‘My worst fear is we have a replay of Ebola, and we
have, say, President Trump assert the policy he thought we ought to have when he was
citizen Trump,’ ... During the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa . . . Trump tweeted
that American health workers who got sick while treating victims should be prevented from
returning to the United States for medical care.”). Instead, the Trump administration
repeatedly contradicted the CDC’s messaging and restricted action that was based on
science. See Jason Dearen, 200,000 Dead as Trump Vilifies Science, Prioritizes Politics, AP
NEWS (Sept. 23, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-donald-trump-ap-topnews-pandemics-health-2c6af8d90eb758cbaa3a40c3cbd7c515 (“Over the past six months,
the Trump administration has prioritized politics over science at key moments, refusing to
follow expert advice that might have contained the spread of the virus and COVID-19, the
disease it causes. Trump and his people have routinely dismissed experts’ assessments of the
gravity of the pandemic…[and] [t]hey have tried to muzzle scientists who dispute the
administration’s rosy spin.”).
61
Stein, supra note 53 (“The outlined changes are being welcome by many health lawyers,
bioethicists and public health specialists as providing important tools for protecting the
public. . . .While he agrees the civil liberties protections in the new regulations should be
even stronger, [Lawrence] Gostin argues they’re better than relying on the protections in the
old rules.”).
57

Published by LAW eCommons,

11

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences, Vol. 31 [], Iss. 1, Art. 3

112

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences

Vol. 31

exercises its quarantine powers remained true.62 That was, until the
government was forced to play its hand by the COVID-19 pandemic.63
B. Unprepared, Inefficient, and Underfunded: The U.S. Response to
COVID-19
Instead of focusing on contact tracing and spread reduction, collectively,
the federal government’s response at large throughout the first hundred days
of the COVID-19 pandemic concentrated heavily on reactionary travel
restrictions, recommendations, economic impact, and disease treatment.64
The HHS and the CDC, however, engaged in arguably their most aggressive
use of their quarantine powers during the COVID-19 pandemic.65
One of the first governmental responses to COVID-19, and evidence of
the dramatically increased use of quarantine power, was the repatriation of
U.S. citizens in the Hubei Province of China to the United States.66 Isolation
and quarantine sites took in roughly 800 people from Hubei Province.67
Simultaneously, approximately 2,300 U.S. citizens were repatriated and
quarantined from the Diamond Princess and Grand Princess cruise ships,
bringing the total of those subjected to federal quarantine to over 3,000.68
According to available sources, this was the most extensive quarantine effort
undertaken by the federal government in recent history.69 While the HHS
believed these efforts likely slowed the spread of the virus to some degree, it
simultaneously acknowledged that such federal efforts would not address the
further spread of COVID-19 on other vessels and that such an operation
could not be effectively scaled at the federal level to the needs of the
pandemic due to limited resources.70

62
See Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 590-91 (D.N.J. 2016) (explaining the CDC
has authority to quarantine individuals suspected of carrying certain communicable diseases,
but rarely does so).
63
Stein, supra note 53 (discussing CDC powers, regulations and procedures in order to avert
the danger of quarantinable communicable disease in the U.S.); see also Lawrence O. Gostin
et al., Presidential Powers and Response to COVID-19, 323 [J]AMA 1547 (2020) (“[The
CDC’s] extensive use of federal quarantine powers has no modern precedent.”).
64
See generally Schwellenbach, supra note 15.
65
Stein, supra note 53 (discussing the extent of the CDCs quarantine powers to avert the
danger of quarantinable communicable diseases).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
See Control of Communicable Diseases; Foreign Quarantine, 85 Fed. Reg. 56424-01 (Sep.
11, 2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 71).
69
Id.
70
Id.
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Meanwhile, other areas of the federal government were slow to react.71
After the first known U.S. citizen was diagnosed with COVID-19 in early
January 2020, the U.S. merely increased the existing travel warning on
Wuhan.72 Weeks later, restrictions were expanded to all of China.73 Similar
travel advisories were soon created for South Korea, Italy, and Iran, among
others.74
The fumbled attempt to roll-out accurate testing further highlights the
laxity of the federal government’s response.75 The first diagnostic test to be
publicized by the WHO was created on January 16, 2020 in Germany;
however, the White House declared a strong preference for a diagnostic test
produced in the United States.76 Not until the end of February—four weeks
after the WHO had begun its global distribution of tests—would the FDA
permit independent COVID-19 tests in the U.S.77 Furthermore, the White
House did not release guidance to the public regarding social distancing and
minimizing group activity until after declaring a state of emergency on March
13, 2020.78 This guidance from the White House did not include the

71

See Eric Lipton et al., He Could Have Seen What Was Coming: Behind Trump’s Failure
on the Virus, N.Y. TIMES, (July 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/20202,
2020/04/11/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-response.html (discussing how President Trump
was slow to act in response to COVID-19).
72
Schwellenbach, supra note 15 (“Although it would not be discovered until nearly the end
of the month, the first known traveler with coronavirus came to the U.S. on January 13.”).
73
Id. (“DAY 29: Trump Administration Announces Restrictions on Travel from China”).
74
See id. (detailing that on February 29, 2020 “[t]he Trump administration announces it is
increasing its travel warnings to the highest level with regards to certain areas in Italy and
South Korea and expands Iran-related travel restrictions.”); see also Daniel B. Jernigan,
Update: Public Health Response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Outbreak United States,
February 24, 2020, 69 CDC MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 216, 217 (2020), (giving
a timeline in late February 2020 when travel notices were posted for Hong Kong, Japan,
Iran, Italy, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam).
75
See id. (discussing the first 100 days of U.S government’s response to COVID).
76
Dilip Hiro, Comparing the US’ and China’s Response to Covid-19, NATION (Apr. 28,
2020) https://www.thenation.com/article/world/coronavirus-us-china-response/ (claiming
President Trump “demanded a test produced by US scientists”).
77
Id.
78
See 15 Days to Slow the Spread, WHITE HOUSE,
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/articles/15-days-slow-spread/ (Mar. 16, 2020)
(explaining new guidelines to protect Americans from COVID-19); see also Proclamation
on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID19) Outbreak, WHITE HOUSE, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidentialactions/proclamation-declaring-national-emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-diseasecovid-19-outbreak/ (March 13, 2020) (proclaiming the COVID-19 outbreak a national
emergency).

Published by LAW eCommons,

13

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences, Vol. 31 [], Iss. 1, Art. 3

114

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences

Vol. 31

recommendation of wearing face coverings in public, which was announced
in April by the CDC.79
While the federal government did act in response to the COVID-19
pandemic, its actions—especially in the early stages of the outbreak—were
delayed and minimal.80 It quickly became obvious that the CDC’s seemingly
broad isolation and quarantine powers were not feasible to implement on the
scale needed for an infectious disease like COVID-19.81 Adding to the
inability for a federally-led quarantine protocol, the federal government also
failed to provide a national plan for contact tracing.82 As a result, states were
left to create their own contact tracing programs, essentially being told to do
as they wish.83 The White House’s effort to block an additional twenty-five
billion dollars in aid for state contact tracing programs, claiming the “states
already ha[d] funding”, added insult to injury.84
Underfunded even before the pandemic, state public health departments
found themselves without the financial means to create and scale the contact
tracing programs needed for this outbreak.85 The lack of substantive federal
aid forcibly created a patchwork of inefficient programs and resulted in an
“uneven implementation” of contact tracing.86 From the start of the pandemic
through July of 2020, no federal dollars were specifically spent on contact
79
See Schwellenbach, supra note 15 (explaining the White House voluntary guidance on day
74, which does not include mask wearing recommendations); see also COVID-19:
Considerations for Wearing Masks, CDC (April 19, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cloth-face-coverguidance.html (issuing guidance for wearing masks).
80
See Jacquelyn Corley, U.S. Government Response to COVID-19 was Slow. But how does
it Compare to Other Countries?, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2020, 8:12 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelyncorley/2020/04/10/us-government-response-tocovid-19-was-slow-but-how-does-it-compare-to-other-countries/?sh=6d0c5fdd6dc2
(discussing how America was slow to escalate its policies in response to COVID compared
to other countries); see also Michael D. Shear et al., The Lost Month: How a Failure to Test
Blinded the U.S. to Covid-19, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020),
https://www.nytimfes.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronavirus-pandemic.html (discussing the
effect of the U.S. government’s failures in testing for COVID-19).
81
See Stein, supra note 53 (displaying the CDCs powers to prohibit introduction of persons
into the U.S. from certain places in order to avert the danger of communicable diseases).
82
See Christie Aschwanden, Contact Tracing, a Key Way to Slow COVID-19, Is Badly
Underused by the U.S., SCI. AM. PUB. HEALTH (July 21, 2020),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/contact-tracing-a-key-way-to-slow-covid-19-isbadly-underused-by-the-u-s/ (discussing U.S. shortcomings in regard to contact tracing).
83
Id; see Selena Simmons-Duffin, Why Contact Tracing Couldn’t Keep Up With the U.S.
COVID Outbreak, NPR (June 3, 2021), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2021/06/03/1002878557/why-contact-tracing-couldnt-keep-up-with-the-u-s-covidoutbreak (“The lack of federal leadership made it hard for different contact tracing programs
to learn from each other...”).
84
Aschwanden, supra note 82.
85
Id.
86
Id.; Simmons-Duffin, supra note 83.
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tracing.87 Seemingly, one of the largest obstacles to effective contact tracing
in the U.S. was the federal government.88 Legislators seeking to reshape
future pandemic response and contact tracing in the U.S. should look to other
countries for guidance.
III. FOREIGN SUCCESS: COVID-19 RESPONSE & CONTACT TRACING IN
CHINA
China is no stranger to outbreaks of infectious diseases.89 Before COVID19, the Chinese government had revamped its ability to respond to epidemics
based on prior experience.90 On January 3, 2020, within one week of the
discovery of the novel coronavirus, the Chinese National Health Commission
(CNHC) centralized testing, started epidemiological investigations,
identified the novel coronavirus, and made its genome available worldwide.91
As the disease began to rapidly spread, the novel coronavirus was
classified as a “category B infectious disease,” which authorized Chinese
medical institutions to isolate patients and take the precautions needed to
identify and trace cases.92 New hospitals were built to handle the potential
influx of cases while old hospitals were prepared to start receiving patients.93
Among the most drastic of the measures taken, the Chinese government
placed a lockdown order on the eleven-million people of Wuhan and
surrounding residents.94 To enforce these orders, the government sent
officials to civilian homes to enforce quarantine and isolation orders.95

87

Id.
See Alice Miranda Ollstein & Darius Tahir, Contact Tracing Foiled by Conspiracy
Theories, Lack of Federal Messaging, POLITICO (Sept. 3, 2020, 7:55 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/03/contact-tracing-conspiracy-theories-trumpmessaging-408611 (suggesting a significant challenge was the White House’s silence
regarding contact tracing efforts).
89
See China’s Recent History of Deadly Epidemics, MED. XPRESS (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://medicalxpress.com/news/2020-01-china-history-deadly-epidemics.html (recapping
the history of deadly epidemics in China).
90
Nourah S. AlTakarli, China’s Response to the COVID-19 Outbreak: A Model for
Epidemic Preparedness and Management, 3 DUBAI MED. J. 44, 45–46 (2020).
91
Hiro, supra note 76; AlTakarli, supra note 90 at 46.
92
Hiro, supra note 76; AlTakarli, supra note 90 at 46.
93
AlTakarli, supra note 90, at 47.
94
Schwellenbach, supra note 15; Hiro, supra note 76.
95
AlTakarli, supra note 90, at 46.
88
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Despite the controversy over their methods, China was able to quell the initial
spread of the coronavirus by March 2020.96
Concerted contact tracing for every positive case was an integral part of
the Chinese response to the pandemic.97 Shao Yiming, a virologist at the
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC), claimed that
China’s ability to contain the spread was in large part facilitated by their
comprehensive contact tracing.98 To carry out such intensive work at such a
large scale, the CCDC mobilized the vast resources at its disposal,
establishing a coalition of over 1,300 teams assigned to investigate the
epidemic and closely monitor public transportation, and utilizing big data.99
Government officials used tech-based systems integrated into popular apps—
namely Alipay and WeChat—to track individuals’ travel history and health,
assigning them a “health code color,” named a “health card.”100 Since the
“health card” in everyone’s pockets tracked their movements, contact tracers
no longer needed to rely solely on an individuals’ possibly faulty memory.101
Such comprehensive digital contact tracing and tracking was possible due to
China’s “highly digitized and online urban society . . . and weak constraints
from privacy concerns and civil liberties.”102
96
See Hiro, supra note 76 (describing how by early March 2020, “daily new cases in Wuhan
had already dropped to 19 from thousands a day a month earlier”); Ken Moritsugu, A
Pandemic Atlas: China’s State Power Crushes COVID-19, AP NEWS (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/health-china-pandemics-coronavirus-pandemic-2019-2020coronavirus-pandemic-56675860128a7ded7e97a3016d212fef (“[I]n a sense, the crisis
illustrates the strength of the [Chinese] system, and its dark side. The virus has been kept at
bay – but only because of the government’s power to dictate monumental changes and its
willingness to use surveillance and censorship to control its people.”). In August of 2021, the
Chinese government, in response to a surge in cases driven by the delta variant, sectioned off
parts of Wuhan again and scheduled all 12 million residents for testing. See Ryan Woo,
China’s Wuhan to Test All 12 Million Residents as Delta Variant Spreads, REUTERS (Aug. 3,
2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-reports-90-new-coronavirus-cases-aug-2vs-98-day-earlier-2021-08-03/.
97
Jon Cohen, ‘The House Was on Fire.’ Top Chinese Virologist on How China and U.S.
Have Met the Pandemic, SCI. MAG. (May 22, 2020),
https://www.science.org/news/2020/05/house-was-fire-top-chinese-virologist-how-chinaand-us-have-met-pandemic (stating that based on models, if the lockdown had started one
week later there was a possibility of a sixfold increase in cases).
98
Id.
99
Jacques DeLisle, China’s Administrative State Is Both a Blessing and a Curse, REGUL.
REV. (June 30, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/06/30/delisle-chinaadministrative-state-both-blessing-curse/; see also Cohen, supra note 97.
100
AlTakarli, supra note 90, at 46; Cohen, supra note 97; See Daniel Keyes & Greg
Magana, REPORT: Chinese Fintechs Like Ant Financial’s Alipay and Tencent’s WeChat
Are Rapidly Growing Their Financial Services Ecosystem, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 18, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/china-fintech-alipay-wechat (detailing Alipay and
WeChat’s market dominance).
101
AlTakarli, supra note 90, at 46; Cohen, supra note 97.
102
DeLisle, supra note 99.
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One year after the novel coronavirus was discovered in its borders, China
reported over 97,000 confirmed cases and over 4,600 confirmed deaths due
to COVID-19,103 showing that China’s public health measures designed to
contain and stop the spread of COVID-19 were extremely effective.104
Although China’s success is enticing, their digital contact tracing model is
simply a bad fit for the United States.105
China’s methods raise privacy concerns that would make adoption in the
U.S. difficult since experts believe transparency over the use of such personal
data is of the utmost importance.106 The “health card” was likely integrated
into Alipay and WeChat purposefully given their immense popularity;107
these apps are nearly essential for most basic activities of daily life like going
to work, entering the market, or riding on public transit.108 However, how the
103

Coronavirus Map, supra note 18.
Coronavirus Map, supra note 18. The rhetoric surrounding the Chinese government’s
handling of COVID-19 has been extremely diverse in the United States. Many outlets were
highly critical of the government’s actions in ways that fed into the common “Yellow Peril”
narrative. See, e.g., Wenshan Jia & Fangzhu Lu, US Media’s Coverage of China’s Handling
of COVID-19: Playing the Role of the Fourth Branch of Government or the Fourth Estate?,
6 GLOBAL MEDIA & CHINA 8, 8-10 (2021) (describing potentially racist and xenophobic
trends of U.S. rhetoric regarding the COVID-19 pandemic). This rhetoric seems to have
contributed to the increase in anti-Asian rhetoric and hate crimes against people of Asian
descent in the U.S. and around the world. See Covid-19 Fueling Anti-Asian Racism and
Xenophobia Worldwide, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 12, 2020, 3:12pm),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/12/covid-19-fueling-anti-asian-racism-and-xenophobiaworldwide (discussing how “increases in racist rhetoric have coincided with increases in
racist attacks… since February, Asians and people of Asian descent around the world have
been subjected to attacks and beatings, violent bullying, threats, racist abuse, and
discrimination that appear linked to the pandemic.”). This author, as one of many recipients
of racism towards the Asian American community before and during the pandemic,
highlights that it is extremely important to levy criticisms of the Chinese government’s
actions towards the government, not its citizenry. The Chinese government’s response leaves
much to be desired in terms of privacy and human rights. However, the framing behind these
critiques should be pointed and thoughtful as to not promote or facilitate further xenophobia
towards Asians and Asian Americans, which is often overlooked.
105
See generally Kasra Zarei, Digital Contact Tracing Efforts Hampered by Privacy
Concerns, GOV’T TECH. (July 8, 2020), https://www.govtech.com/health/Digital-ContactTracing-Efforts-Hampered-by-Privacy-Concerns.html (outlining experts’ concerns regarding
digital contact tracing tools in the United States).
106
Id.
107
See Shirin Ghaffary, What the U.S. can Learn from Other Countries Using Phones to
Track COVID-19, VOX (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/4/18/21224178/covid-19-tech-tracking-phones-chinasingapore-taiwan-korea-google-apple-contact-tracing- (discussing popular private app
companies partnering with the Chinese government to create app “add-ons” for tracking
COVID-19).
108
Id.
104
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Chinese digital contact tracing system works was not publicly explained.109
A similarly secretive system in the U.S. would likely exacerbate recent
conflicts over civil liberties and privacy, dooming widespread adoption.110
Instead, the U.S. should seek to emulate a model that boasts greater
transparency, and in turn foster public support and comfort.
IV. SOUTH KOREA: THE INFECTIOUS DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
ACT (“IDCPA”) POST-MERS AND DIGITAL TRACKING & CONTACT
TRACING
As China stamped out COVID-19 cases, similar success was being
attained just across the Yellow Sea. South Korea’s strong response to the
coronavirus pandemic is not due to luck; it is a product of experience.111 In
2015, South Korea was the unfortunate host to one of the worst outbreaks of
MERS in the world.112 The outbreak started after a South Korean citizen
returned from a trip in Bahrain.113 By the time it was discovered that he was
infected with MERS, the patient had already spread the disease to nearly
thirty others during his hospital-to-hospital detour.114 A similar patient,
dubbed “Patient 14,” infected another eighty-two people.115 After the
outbreak, South Korea took legislative action to ensure it would not repeat
past mistakes.116 The legislature made significant amendments to the IDCPA,
“clarifying the roles of national and local government, public health, and
industry sectors in the event of another outbreak.”117

109
Paul Mozur et al., In Coronavirus Fight, China Gives Citizens a Color Code, With Red
Flags, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/chinacoronavirus-surveillance.html (last updated July 26, 2021).
110
See Zarei, supra note 105 (outlining experts’ concerns regarding digital contact tracing
tools in the United States).
111
HyunJung Kim, South Korea Learned Its Successful COVID-19 Strategy from a Previous
Coronavirus Outbreak: MERS, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://thebulletin.org/2020/03/south-korea-learned-its-successful-covid-19-strategy-from-aprevious-coronavirus-outbreak-mers/.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
See Landman, supra note 28 (discussing legislation promulgated by South Korea in
response to COVID-19).
117
Id.; see also Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, amended by Act No. 14286,
Dec. 2, 2016 (S. Kor.).
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A. South Korea Overhauls the IDCPA In the Wake of MERS
In an attempt to regain public trust, South Korea made sweeping changes
to the IDCPA.118 The amendments provided a legal grounding that facilitated
“clear central-local cooperation” and delegated the actual implementation of
control measures to local governments.119 Public health officials also gained
the ability to close various facilities and acquire CCTV footage and cell
phone records to ascertain individuals’ movements while infected.120 South
Korea’s digital contact tracing program during the COVID-19 pandemic was
made possible by the far-reaching provisions of the IDCPA amendments.121
Under article 76-2(1) of the IDCPA, the Health Minister and the Director
of the Korean Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“KCDC”) have
the authority to force “medical institutions, … corporations, … and
individuals to provide information concerning patients and potential
patients.”122 Article 76-2(2) adds to this far-reaching power, giving the
Health Minister the ability to acquire private data from both confirmed and
potential patients without first needing to acquire a warrant.123
Without defining what a potential patient is, these provisions have
essentially given the South Korean government the ability to extract various
forms of highly sensitive, personal data during a public health emergency.124
Such data could include “surveillance footage, credit card histories, and
cellular geolocation data.”125 The government’s only burden is to notify the
individual and to destroy the information when “the relevant tasks have been

118
See Derek Thompson, What’s Behind South Korea’s COVID-19 Exceptionalism?,
ATLANTIC (May 6, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/whats-southkoreas-secret/611215/ (discussing South Korea’s experience with MERS informing the
nation’s COVID-19 response).
119
Oh, supra note 28.
120
Id.
121
Brian Kim, Lessons For America: How South Korean Authorities Used Law to Fight the
Coronavirus, LAWFARE (Mar. 16, 2020, 2:39 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lessonsamerica-how-south-korean-authorities-used-law-fight-coronavirus; see also Michael Ahn,
How South Korea Flattened the Coronavirus Curve with Technology, CONVERSATION (Apr.
21, 2020, 8:47am), https://theconversation.com/how-south-korea-flattened-the-coronaviruscurve-with-technology-136202 (discussing the legal basis for South Korea’s use of location
information for contact tracing and testing purposes).
122
Kim, supra note 121.
123
Id.
124
See id. (discussing the ability of the South Korean government to collect private data
related to location from surveillance footage and telecommunication companies).
125
Id.
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completed.”126 Additional provisions require certain public disclosures of
information by the Health Minister, including the “movement paths,
transportation means . . . and contacts of patients of the infectious disease.”127
B. Prepared, Efficient, and Informed: The South Korean Response to
COVID-19
While ranked only ninth overall and sixth in “rapid response to and
mitigation of the spread of an epidemic,” South Korea has been ardently
preparing for the possibility of a new infectious disease outbreak ever since
the 2015 MERS outbreak.128 The first confirmed case of COVID-19 in South
Korea was found on the same day as the first case in the United States, yet
South Korea was able slow the spread without resorting to complete
lockdowns.129
Initial public health efforts focused on rapidly building massive testing
centers, establishing over 600 of such centers for COVID-19 testing.130 In
order to minimize the risk of cross contamination and intra-hospital
infections, a major problem during the MERS outbreak, the testing centers
were placed outside of hospitals and other health facilities.131 Additionally,
“hospital and nonclinical facilities [were used] to care for and isolate . . .
infected people.”132 By the end of March, South Korea was able to test as
many as 100,000 people per day and provided free testing for those who met
certain criteria.133 As positive tests turned into a need for treatment, precious
hospital space was prioritized for high-risk patients—low-risk groups were
alternatively sent home to recover in quarantine.134
South Korea also emphasized clear top-down communications. Public
officials held daily briefings to inform the public about government efforts
126

See id. (discussing when the government must destroy the information, but not indicating
the actual methods that must be used by the South Korean government to destroy the data
under this provision).
127
Kim, supra note 121.
128
Global Health Security Index, supra note 3; Timothy Huzar, COVID-19: What Can We
Learn From South Korea’s Response?, MEDICALNEWSTODAY (Aug. 18, 2020),
https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/covid-19-what-can-we-learn-from-southkoreas-response.
129
Tim Mullaney, The US and South Korea Got Coronavirus on the Same Day, But Only
America’s Economy Has Been Destroyed. This is Why, INDEP. (Apr. 2, 2020, 6:56pm),
https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/coronavirus-us-south-korea-economy-when-casesmap-a9444096.html.
130
Landman, supra note 28.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
JaHyun Kang et al., South Korea’s Responses to Stop the COVID-19 Pandemic, 48 AM. J.
INFECTION CONTROL 1080, 1082 (2020) (discussing the diagnostic tests, tracking processes,
and other measures South Korea took to mitigate and manage COVID-19).
134
Kang, supra note 133, at 1083.
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and the pandemic’s status.135 Briefings previously held by bureaucrats were
instead led by scientists to restore the public’s confidence in the
government’s response, which had been severely shaken during the MERS
outbreak.136 This effort blossomed into widespread community cooperation,
thought to be “a key ingredient” in the country’s comprehensive pandemic
response.137
To comply with the mandatory disclosure requirements of the IDCPA,
some local public officials sent daily movement information of infected
individuals via text to local citizens.138 Despite the privacy concerns
associated with such methods, “a social consensus was established” that
normalized the sentiment of prioritizing public cooperation during a public
health emergency.139 As a result, South Korea fared much better than other
similarly situated countries during the initial months of the pandemic.140
Thus, as of January 2021, South Korea reported just over 74,000 confirmed
cases and 1,328 deaths.141
135

Landman, supra note 28.
Id.
137
Id.
138
Kim, supra note 111.
139
Kang, supra note 133, at 1083.
140
See Jim O’Neill, South Korea’s Economy Is Doing Better Than Any Other OECD
Country, WORLD ECON. F. (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/08/south-korea-covid19-government-pandemicresponse/ (comparing South Korea’s economy to other OECD nations); see also Ishaan
Tharoor, South Korea’s Coronavirus Success Story Underscores How the U.S. Initially
Failed, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/03/17/south-koreas-coronavirus-successstory-underscores-how-us-initially-failed/ (comparing South Korea’s response to Covid-19
to the United States’ response); Landman, supra note 28 (“It may be tempting to argue that
South Korea’s response is not culturally portable – that it relies on a high level of public
trust and tolerance for both privacy invasion and centralized government[,] . . . . [b]ut these
arguments ignore South Korea’s own recent experience of public distrust, polarized politics,
and fake news, all of which its leaders and people overcame in their response to the
coronavirus pandemic.”).
141
Number of Coronavirus (COVID-19) confirmed and death cases in South Korea from
January 20, 2020 to October 6, 2021, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1098721/south-korea-coronavirus-confirmed-and-deathnumber/ (measuring cases and deaths on approximately January 21, 2021). Like most
countries, South Korea has struggled to grapple with multiple waves of infections. Cases as
of early August 2021 totaled 203,926, and deaths totaled 2,106. See Hyonhee Shin, S.Korea
COVID-19 Count Spikes Amid Vacations, Spread of New Variants, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2021,
2:43 AM EDT), https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/skorea-covid-19-count-spikesamid-vacations-spread-new-variants-2021-08-04/ (discussing how the difficulty in accessing
a vaccine has likely contributed to new spikes in COVID-19 infections in South Korea); see
136
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C. Technological Success: South Korea’s Digital Contact Tracing
South Korea was in part able to slow the spread of the pandemic by
effectively scaling contact tracing, “a tried-and-true method that
epidemiologists have been using for decades.”142 The IDCPA gave the
KCDC the authority to collect various forms of electronic data, including
GPS location data from phones, in order to track people’s recent movements
for digital contact tracing efforts.143 This enabled the KCDC to conduct an
incredibly efficient and accurate contact tracing program, resulting in the
“rapid identification and isolation . . . of infected people and their close
contacts.”144 Due to the aggregation of personal data with camera footage
and client interviews, the data used for digital contact tracing was extremely
precise.145 By revolutionizing contact tracing in the digital age, South Korea
was able to perform a “thorough epidemiolog[ical] investigation” for every
confirmed case, thought to be essential to their success during the initial
outbreak of COVID-19.146
Consider the following example, which demonstrates the efficacy of South
Korea’s digital contact tracing capabilities.147 After multiple cases of
COVID-19 were reported at various night clubs, contact tracers discovered
that a patron of a night club infected one of their students.148 This student
then infected a taxi-driver who worked as a photographer for a birthday event
at a restaurant.149 By utilizing “surveillance footage and mobile phone
records,” investigators were able to contact everyone who was present at the
restaurant during the birthday party that the taxi-driver had attended.150
Officials determined that one woman was likely infected at the restaurant and
became the subsequent source of another outbreak at the warehouse she
worked at—the warehouse employed over 4,000 people.151 Because of the

also Hyonhee Shin & Sangmi Cha, S.Korea Apologises as Moderna Halves August COVID19 Vaccine Shipments, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2021, 9:09 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-opens-covid-19-vaccinereservations-all-adults-2021-08-09/ (discussing Moderna vaccine shortages in South Korea).
142
Aschwanden, supra note 82.
143
Landman, supra note 28.
144
Id.
145
Huzar, supra note 128.
146
Heesu Lee, The Elite Contact Tracers Show the World How to Beat COVID-19,
BLOOMBERG (July 27, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-25/theseelite-contact-tracers-show-the-world-how-to-beat-covid-19.
147
Id.
148
Lee, supra note 146.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
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vigorous contact tracing and testing that resulted, the potential warehouse
outbreak was limited to only 152 positive cases of the 9,000 people tested.152
In addition to using the data to notify close contacts, the government went
one step further to enable South Korean citizens to take proactive precautions
against possible exposure.153 To that end, government officials publicized
detailed movements of those infected with COVID-19,154 allowing South
Korean citizens to check if the virus had been potentially spread in their area
to take necessary precautions.155
Furthermore, government officials sent emergency text messages to
citizens in their area, warning them of possible exposure.156 Such an
emergency text could reveal one’s age, gender, and a “detailed log of their
movements down to the minute.”157 Some included CCTV footage and
“credit-card transactions, with the time and names of the businesses they
visited.”158 In certain circumstances, these texts even conveyed highly
detailed and sensitive information, such as whether the infected person was
wearing a mask and what rooms the person visited in a building, including
the bathroom.159
This system of public data disclosure was the most transparent and
detailed in the world, as other countries opted for contact tracing methods
that prioritized privacy.160 While this amount of disclosure would be
alarming to most, the South Korean government believed that transparency
was key to gaining the public’s trust.161 Their methods clearly worked,
earning praise from the WHO and other experts who claimed that South
Korea’s digital contact tracing helped to slow the spread and contain the virus
within months.162

152

Id.
Huzar, supra note 128.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Mark Zastrow, South Korea Is Reporting Intimate Details of COVID-19 Cases: Has It
Helped?, NATURE (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00740-y.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.; see also Covid-19 Tracing Apps: Ensuring Privacy and Use Across Borders, EUR.
PARLIAMENT (Dec. 1, 2020),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20200429STO78174/covid-19tracing-apps-ensuring-privacy-and-data-protection (discussing various contact tracing
applications).
161
See Zastrow, supra note 156 (discussing public trust of information about the virus).
162
See id.
153
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V. LEARNING FROM OUR MISTAKES: CO-OPTING THE IDCPA TO BRING
U.S. CONTACT TRACING INTO THE DIGITAL AGE
Contact tracing is critical to curb an outbreak of infectious disease, if it is
done “quickly and effectively, [sic] and efficiently.”163 Whether the U.S.
federal government delegated contact tracing to the states or simply forced
the states to pick up the slack, it is clear that the “patchwork” response that
ensued hindered the country’s ability to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.164
The absence of a unified contact tracing effort caused unnecessary
complications that delayed the country’s recovery.165 While some states took
on the brunt of the contact tracing efforts within their own health
departments, others partnered with neighboring states or contracted out to
third parties.166 Such a scattered response is ineffectual at best and must
change if the U.S. is to properly address future outbreaks of infectious
diseases.167 While privacy advocates endorse decentralized alternatives,
163
DeeDee Stiepan, What Is Contact Tracing, and Why Is It Important in Fight Against
COVID-19?, MAYO CLINIC (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/discussion/what-is-contact-tracing-and-why-is-itimportant-in-fight-against-covid-19/. The more transmissible the disease is, the more
important effective and efficient contact tracing becomes; see e.g., Case Investigation and
Contact Tracing: Part of a Multipronged Approach to Fight the COVID-19 Pandemic, CDC
(Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/principles-contacttracing.html (“Identifying contacts and ensuring they do not interact with others is critical to
protect communities from further spread. If communities are unable to effectively isolate
patients and ensure contacts can separate themselves from others, rapid community spread of
COVID-19 is likely to increase to the point that strict mitigation strategies will again be
needed to contain the virus.”); see also Denise Chow, Why Scientists are Talking About
Viral Load and the Delta Variant, NBC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2021, 6:01 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/delta-variant-viral-load-scientists-arewatching-covid-pandemic-rcna1604 (“[W]ith the delta variant, [the detection] window was
shortened to four days…The shorter window also makes contact tracing even more of a
challenge for public health departments that are already overburdened.”).
164
See Jessie Hellmann & Nathaniel Weixel, Patchwork Approach to Contact Tracing
Hampers National Recovery, HILL (Aug. 30, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/514233-patchwork-approach-to-contact-tracinghampers-national-recovery (discussing the complication of recovery efforts resulting from
states’ varied approaches to pandemic response).
165
See id. (“Experts said such a decentralized approach can miss outbreaks if local
departments aren’t communicating with each other, meaning any data should be public.”).
166
Megan Lent et al., How States Are Ramping Up Their COVID-19 Contact Tracing
Capacity, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y (June 8, 2020),
https://www.nashp.org/how-states-are-ramping-up-their-covid-19-contact-tracing-capacity/.
167
Higgins-Dunn, supra note 26 (“If the country were to experience another pandemic in the
future, officials would need to do a better job of responding to the outbreak ‘in a coordinated
way’ rather than allowing disparate responses from different regions of the country, [Dr.
Anthony] Fauci said during a hearing.”). Digital complements, like the contact tracing apps
used by South Korea and Singapore, can significantly support manual contact tracing efforts.
Jobie Budd et al., Digital Technologies in the Public-Health Response to COVID-19, 26
NATURE MED. 1183, 1188 (2020).
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studies question whether widespread adoption is possible in the U.S.168 To
afford the best possible chance at efficacy, the U.S. must act at the federal
level to unite public health fronts during times of crisis.169 Thus, Congress
should amend the Public Health Service Act to create a model similar to the
South Korean approach and seek to implement a legally authorized and
transparent system of digital contact tracing that will operate within existing
legal principles and privacy protections.
A. Decentralized Contact Tracing and the Fourth Amendment Challenge
Voluntary, decentralized contact tracing apps have been lauded as a
privacy-focused alternative to centralized methods.170 These apps use
Bluetooth to record when two phones are in close proximity, logging the
interaction.171 If one app user tests positive, a message can be sent to their
recent contacts to inform them of possible exposure.172 These decentralized
apps are considered safer for users’ data because the information is kept on
the users’ phones instead of on a central server susceptible to a breach.173
168
Mark Zastrow, Coronavirus Contact-Tracing Apps: Can They Slow the Spread of
COVID-19?, NATURE (May 19, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-015142.
169
Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Thinking Globally, Acting Locally – The U.S.
Response to Covid-19, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED., May 28, 2020, at e75(1) (“Strong, decisive
national action is therefore imperative.”).
170
Cristina Criddle & Leo Kelion, Coronavirus Contact-Tracing: World Split Between Two
Types of App, BBC (May 7, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52355028
(“Supporters of the decentralised approach say it offers users a higher degree of privacy,
protecting them from hackers or the state itself revealing their social contacts.”); Natasha
Lomas, EU Privacy Experts Push a Decentralized Approach to COVID-19 Contacts
Tracing, TECH CRUNCH (Apr. 6, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/06/eu-privacyexperts-push-a-decentralized-approach-to-covid-19-contactstracing/?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_ref
errer_sig=AQAAABgnkY4KB1Z1ARHHxjbjaFzB8Lf_wc0DOyU1C58LZRCfOuVxeZtMwnlNdK41saE5AabAU51GDNvdoLdLQOrgGbYZr675Q7LPTQpvednHoyNoxHk1NG1el4NTlC9yg9jjFjaHJ2gMRi
15XUrAbVKpL8z6cVqLI-dCbfybcAFjkf (“Under [the decentralized] design, there’s no
requirement for pseudonymized IDs to be centralized, where the pooled data would pose a
privacy risk. . . .[Potential threats under the decentralized model] are small and more
manageable vs creating centralized pots of data that risk paving the way for ‘surveillance
creep.’”). But see Lucie White & Philippe van Basshuysen, Privacy Versus Public Health? A
Reassessment of Centralised and Decentralised Digital Contact Tracing, 27 SCI. &
ENGINEERING ETHICS Art. No. 23, at 10 (2021) (challenging the notion that decentralized
apps are “inherently safe” and promoting a centralized design).
171
Criddle & Kelion, supra note 171.
172
Id.
173
Id.
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Singapore successfully deployed a decentralized app, TraceTogether, as one
component of its strict contact tracing and quarantining approach to curbing
the spread of COVID-19.174
However, decentralized contact tracing apps are not without their flaws.175
Issues such as false positives and false negatives; the failure to take into
account personal precautions such as mask wearing; and minor or brief
contacts that are unlikely to transmit infectious diseases may cripple the
effectiveness of decentralized apps.176 Decentralization also deprives public
health institutions of highly important “anonymous aggregated data.”177
Perhaps more importantly, widespread adoption is absolutely necessary for
decentralized apps to work.178 Experts estimate that an adoption rate of sixty
percent or greater is necessary for Bluetooth apps to be effective.179
Singapore’s TraceTogether only achieved a country-wide adoption rate of
twenty percent in the early stages of the pandemic.180 Meanwhile, several
states in the U.S. tested decentralized apps and limited results showed woeful

174
Saheli Roy Choudhury, Singapore Says It Will Make Its Contact Tracing Tech Freely
Available to Developers, CNBC (Mar. 25, 2020, 2:40 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/25/coronavirus-singapore-to-make-contact-tracing-techopen-source.html.
175
Zastrow, supra note 156.
176
Jennifer Daskal & Matt Perault, The Apple-Google Contact Tracing System Won’t Work.
It Still Deserves Praise., SLATE (May 22, 2020, 12:11 PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2020/05/apple-google-contact-tracing-app-privacy.html; See
also Ashkan Soltani et al., Contact-Tracing Apps are Not a Solution to the COVID-19
Crisis, BROOKINGS (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/inaccurate-andinsecure-why-contact-tracing-apps-could-be-a-disaster/.
177
Joseph Duball, Centralized vs. Decentralized: EU’s Contact Tracing Privacy
Conundrum, IAPP (Apr. 28, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/centralized-vs-decentralized-euscontact-tracing-privacy-conundrum/.
178
Zastrow, supra note 168 (explaining that although efficacy of such apps is yet to be
proved, “[m]odelling suggests they can help to slow the spread of the virus — but only if
enough of the population uses them,” and that “a take-up threshold of 60% of the population
can bring an outbreak under control”).
179
Id.; Daskal & Perault, supra note 176.
180
See Sarah Kreps et al., Contact-Tracing Apps Face Serious Adoption Obstacles,
BROOKINGS (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/contact-tracing-appsface-serious-adoption-obstacles/.While Singapore’s app did reach nearly eighty percent
adoption, it did so under coercive government requirements, despite being advertised as
optional at the start of the pandemic. See Kyra Jasper & Camille Bismonte, Singapore’s
Updated TraceTogether Privacy Policy Could Erode Public Trust, CTR. STRATEGIC INT’L
STUDIES (Feb. 17, 2021), (stating the government required a high rate of adoption of
TraceTogether for Singapore to enter Phase 3 of its reopening process).

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol31/iss1/3

26

Cederblom: Welcome to the Digital Age: Reinventing Contact Tracing and the P

2022

Welcome to the Digital Age

127

adoption rates.181 Polling also shows that the U.S. population is relatively
averse to voluntarily downloading a contact tracing app.182
A mandatory centralized program on the other hand, where the
government compels the distribution of location data by third party
telecommunication companies, faces another potential hurdle in the form of
the Fourth Amendment.183 Federal contact tracing legislation can be justified
under the Commerce Clause, but courts have not yet had the occasion to rule
on whether a unilateral centralized collection effort of location data for digital
contact tracing programs would violate one’s “reasonable expectation of
privacy.”184 Such a centralized system would likely implicate Carpenter v.
United States, a landmark case where the Supreme Court held Fourth
Amendment protections apply to historical cell-site location (HCSL) data.185
Due to the highly sensitive and intrusive nature of HCSL data, essentially
allowing the government to track Carpenter’s complete movement history,
181
Zastrow, supra note 156; Alejandro De La Garza, Contact Tracing Apps Were Big Tech’s
Best Idea for Fighting COVID-19. Why Haven’t They Helped? TIME (Nov. 10, 2020, 7:00
AM), https://time.com/5905772/covid-19-contact-tracing-apps/ (explaining how even
though Bluetooth based contact tracing apps are available in ten states, “adoption generally
remains low”).
182
Kat Jercich, Survey Says Majority of Americans Won’t Use COVID-19 Contact-Tracing
Apps, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (June 16, 2020),
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/survey-says-majority-americans-wont-use-covid19-contact-tracing-apps.
183
See Patrick McKnight, Could Contact Tracing Technology Violate the Fourth
Amendment, A.B.A. (June 11, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/cybe
rspace/2020/202006/contact-tracing/ (discussing government-mandated contact tracing and
the Fourth Amendment).
184
Id. The Commerce Clause was the justification of power used to enact the Public Health
Service Act, the main source of power for federal disease spread prevention and emergency
public health measures. This exercise of Commerce Clause power has not been challenged in
court. See 42 U.S.C. § 264 (discussing regulations to control communicable diseases);
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (“[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though
it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce... In this vein, we
have reiterated that when ‘a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to
commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no
consequence.’”); see also Two Centuries of Law Guide Legal Approach to Modern
Pandemic, A.B.A. (Apr. 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2020/youraba-april2020/law-guides-legal-approach-to-pandemic/ (discussing constitutional authority
surrounding emergency public health measures).
185
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018); Shane Rogers, Two Years of
Carpenter, COVINGTON (July 7, 2020), https://www.insideprivacy.com/uncategorized/twoyears-of-carpenter/.
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the Court in Carpenter reasoned that individuals have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in such data, and that the application of the third-party
doctrine in this specific factual scenario would inappropriately presume that
“consumers assume the risk of warrantless government surveillance simply
by using technologies that are … increasingly integrated into modern life.”186
Carpenter has been less impactful than dissenters originally thought, but the
holding has expanded to other similar forms of data such as real-time cellsite location information, and HCSL data covering shorter periods of time.187
What is especially troublesome about Carpenter is its application to public
health and disease control. Typically, the Fourth Amendment requires
government searches to be reasonable; i.e., get a warrant.188 But a warrant is
not always required, such as when exigent circumstances exist, an explicit
exception carved out by the Court in Carpenter.189 Lower courts have applied
the exigent circumstances exception to searches where active danger is
involved, such as bomb threats and active shootings.190 Potentially, such an
exception could be expanded to include major public health emergencies like
a global pandemic. Where the COVID-19 pandemic produced nearly
363,000 deaths in the U.S. in under a year, the threat of imminent harm is
unfathomably greater than anything considered in Carpenter, and digital
contact tracing for public health emergencies—like pandemics—could fall
under this exception.191
However, exigent circumstances exceptions are typically very narrowly
defined.192 In the context of law enforcement, there is still a general
requirement that the police have probable cause of the activity at issue where
exigent circumstances arise.193 Public health interventions, specifically
disease spread prevention, requires constant data analysis and collection,
including of asymptomatic individuals where something similar to “probable
cause” may be lacking.194 Thus, application of the exigent circumstances
186
Jeewon Kim Serrato et al., US Supreme Court Expands Digital Privacy Rights in
Carpenter v United States, DATA PROTECTION REP. (June 27, 2018),
https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2018/06/scotus-expands-digital-privacy-rightscarpenter/.
187
Shane Rogers, supra note 185.
188
Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Disease Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, LAWFARE (Apr.
7, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/disease-surveillance-and-fourth-amendment#.
189
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222.
190
Id. at 2223.
191
See Carpenter,138 S. Ct. at 2221; see also Bill Chappell, ‘Enormous and Tragic’: U.S.
Has Lost More Than 200,000 People to COVID-19, NPR (Sept. 22, 2020, 11:39 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/09/22/911934489/enormousand-tragic-u-s-has-lost-more-than-200-000-people-to-covid-19 (discussing COVID-19 death
toll in the United States).
192
Rozenshtein, supra note 188.
193
Id.
194
Id.
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exception may be a dead end for federal contact tracing legislation during a
pandemic.195
A more promising defense lies in the special needs doctrine.196 The United
States Supreme Court has held that, “where a Fourth Amendment intrusion
serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations
against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to
require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular
context.”197
Courts in the past have held that the prevention of terrorism is a special
need that is both immediate and substantial and, therefore, that justifies
certain warrantless searches.198 This justification should be extended to
outbreaks of highly infectious diseases. The worst terrorist event in U.S.
history, 9/11, claimed nearly 3,000 lives in a single day.199 The human toll
attributable to the unchecked spread of the coronavirus presented (and
continues to present via variants like the delta variant) a threat to the public
safety that is not only akin to that of a terrorist attack, but far exceeds any
and all terrorist attacks that have occurred on U.S. soil.200 From April through
December of 2020, the U.S. experienced the equivalent of between one and

195

Id.
Id.
197
Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-6 (1989); see also
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (“[W]e have permitted exceptions when
‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make warrant and probablecause requirement impracticable.’”).
198
MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 271 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding a New York program
which installed inspection checkpoints in New York subways to deter and uncover terrorist
attacks under the special needs doctrine); United States. v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179 (3rd
Cir. 2006) (recognizing the need to “prevent terrorist attacks on airplanes” and rejecting a
Fourth Amendment claim against airport checkpoint searches).
199
US Terrorist Attacks Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 2, 2021, 2:51 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/04/18/us/u-s-terrorist-attacks-fast-facts/index.html.
200
Id.; See also COVID-19 Death Data and Resources: Daily Updates of Totals by Week
and State, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 27, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/covid19/index.htm (reporting COVID-19 death data);
Ariana Eunjung Cha, Dan Keating, & Jacqueline Dupree, U.S. Covid Death Toll Hits 1,500
a Day Amid Delta Scourge, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2021, 11:21 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2021/09/03/delta-deaths-us-fourth-wave/
(explaining the rise in deaths alongside the surge of the delta variant and how even after
logging over 640,000 deaths, “many experts believe we are not yet at the peak”).
196
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seven 9/11 events every week in terms of lives lost.201 Where the courts have
allowed warrantless searches of individuals under the justification of
preventing future terrorism, it surely follows that a special need exists for the
prevention of the unchecked spread of infectious diseases such as COVID19.
B. Reinventing the Public Health Service Act for a Modern Pandemic
Response
This article proposes that additional provisions be added to the Public
Health Service Act that would allow the CDC to collect location data and
assist state Departments of Health to create a digital contact tracing system.
These additional provisions aim to provide transparency and privacy
protections for the limited use of individual’s location data. The proposed
additions to 42 U.S.C. § 264, which shall be inserted after existing subsection
(d), shall read as follows:202
§ 264. Regulations and permitted actions to control communicable
diseases203
(e) Request for de-identified location data
(1) The Surgeon General, with the approval of the
Secretary, during a national state of emergency declared
in response to an outbreak of a communicable disease as
specified by executive order of the President pursuant to
subsection (b), may instruct the Director of the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, in order to prevent
the transmission or spread of such a communicable
disease from one State or possession into any other State
or possession, to collect the location data of all
individuals in any of the fifty States and District of
Columbia. The Director may order the heads of
telecommunications companies in the fifty States and
201
See COVID-19 Death Data and Resources: Daily Updates of Totals by Week and State,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 27, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/covid19/index.htm (During this time, the CDC reported
a weekly low of 3,000 deaths, the first week of this period, and a weekly high of 21,000
deaths. The percentage of COVID-19 deaths of expected deaths (as a percentage of all cause
deaths) is also provided. These numbers indicate “All Deaths involving COVID-19”, but the
table also provides numbers regarding deaths involving COVID-19 and pneumonia (see
Table 1, columns one and two between 3/28/2020 and 12/26/2020, and columns 3, 4, and
6)).
202
The proposed amendment would start as the new subsection (e) of the statute and end as
the new subsection (i).
203
42 U.S.C. § 264 (“permitted actions” [emphasis added] has also been appended to the
name of the section).
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District of Columbia to provide the cell-site location
data (“location data”) of all individuals and customers as
reasonably necessary under this subsection.204
(2) Any and all location data collected at the request of the
Director, provided by telecommunications companies,
shall be de-identified to the fullest extent possible. Deidentification of the location data shall be the
responsibility of the telecommunications companies.
(3) For the purposes of this subsection, the term “deidentify” means to remove personal identifiers from a
set of data such as, but not limited to, the name, age,
phone number, email address, social security number,
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, medical record
numbers, and biometric identifiers.205
(f) Assisting State digital contact tracing efforts
(1) For the purpose of preventing the transmission or spread
of a communicable disease from one State or possession
into any other State or possession, the Director may
provide the de-identified location data collected under
subsection (e) to a State’s Department of Health for the
purpose of supplementing manual contact tracing with a
digital contact tracing system for those infected or
reasonably believed to be infected.
(2) The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention may not
use or share this data for any purpose other than to
collect and redistribute it to State Departments of Health
for digital contact tracing programs.

204
One note of importance regarding this section – the CDC Director may collect the
location data of all individuals as reasonably necessary. This implies that if an outbreak is
highly localized and warrants the collection of location data for contact tracing, it would be
improper for the CDC Director to collect the location data of a separate locality where
disease outbreak is of no current concern.
205
Telecommunication companies de-identifying location data should seek to use the
HIPAA Privacy Rule’s “Safe Harbor” method as a guide for the types of identifiers to be
removed from the data set. As many identifiers as possible should be removed from this list
to protect privacy. Additionally, it would be wise to also use the expert determination
method found under § 164.514 of the HIPAA Privacy Rule which applies statistical or
scientific principles to ensure the risk of reidentification is sufficiently small. See Guidance
Regarding Methods for De-Identification of Protected Health Information in Accordance
with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, U.S.
DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/specialtopics/de-identification/index.html#rationale (Nov. 6, 2015) (explaining HIPAA privacy
rule’s de-identification standards).
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(3) Telecommunications companies shall be responsible for
re-identifying location data provided under this
subsection. Telecommunications companies shall only
re-identify the location data for a State Department of
Health and only for the express purpose of digital
contact tracing.206
(4) The federal government shall provide the reasonably
necessary funding to States, as determined by the
Director, that choose to use the location data provided
under this subsection for digital contact tracing, for
associated costs necessary to receive, store, use, and
destroy such data.
(5) Any State Department of Health that chooses to use
location data provided under this subsection shall not
use such data for any purpose besides digital contact
tracing of persons infected or reasonably believed to be
infected with a communicable disease. The State
Department of Health shall also not transfer or share the
data with any other government agency, business, or
individual unrelated to the digital contact tracing
program. The State Department of Health shall not
make any location data publicly available or accessible
and shall take all possible precautions to protect any
location data.
(6) Any State Department of Health that chooses to use
location data provided under this subsection shall
provide notice to any affected individual that their
location data is being used for digital contact tracing.
Upon completion of contact tracing for an individual,
the State Department of Health shall destroy any and all
location data pertaining to the individual within seven
(7) days.
(7) Upon notice by the Director or upon the end of the state
of emergency required under subsection (e), the State
Department of Health shall destroy all location data
provided under this subsection within seven (7) days.
(8) Upon notice of a State’s failure to abide by their
obligations under this subsection, the Director shall
cease the provision of any location data and related
206

Under this provision, telecommunication companies cannot re-identify the data for the
federal government. The deidentification for the state government is only for the Department
of Health and only for the purpose of use in a digital contact tracing program during an
outbreak of an infectious disease. While telecommunication companies may be tempted to
share the location information with other private companies, what the companies choose to
do with the data with entities other than state and federal governments, or their own personal
use of the data, is beyond the scope of this amendment and this article.
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funding as provided under this subsection unless strict
compliance can be reasonably assured.
(g) Initial collection, maintenance, and destruction of location data
(1) Upon the initial request by the Director under subsection
(e), telecommunications companies shall provide the
Director the location data of all individuals and
customers for the fourteen (14) days prior to the request.
Until the state of emergency ceases or the Director
makes clear that the location data is no longer needed,
telecommunications companies shall continue to provide
updated location data every three (3) days.
(2) The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention shall,
for the duration of the state of emergency, on a regular
basis, destroy any location data collected under
subsection (e) that is older than fourteen (14) days.
(3) Upon the decision of the Director, or upon the end of the
national state of emergency, the Director shall order the
complete destruction of all location information
collected under subsection (e) within seven (7) days.
(h) Civil action for impermissible conduct
Any individual may recover damages in the amount of $10,000,
for each violation, from any involved party for the purposeful,
knowing, reckless, or negligent improper de-identification, use,
transfer, or failure to destroy their location data within seven (7)
days, as specified under subsections (e), (f), or (g).
(i) Preemption
Except as otherwise provided, subsections (e), (f), (g), and/or (h)
shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to the ability of the federal or a state government
to obtain and distribute location data within a state to prevent the
transmission or spread of a communicable disease from one State
or possession into any other State or possession.

As discussed above, this legislation relies on the Commerce Clause, the
existing justification for the Public Health Service Act.207 The argument rests
207
As an amendment to the Public Health Service Act, this legislation would use the same
justification, the Commerce Clause. In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court held that even
local, non-commercial activity could be regulated by federal statute under the Commerce
Clause so long as the statute “bears a substantial relation to commerce.” 545 U.S. 1, 17
(2005). See also Two Centuries of Law Guide Legal Approach to Modern Pandemic, supra
note 177 (describing the legal justification of the Public Health Service Act as coming from
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on the hypothetical situation where the unchecked spread of a communicable
disease within a state would necessarily have a substantial impact on
interstate commerce as individuals freely move between the states.208 This
hypothetical has been perfectly demonstrated by the coronavirus pandemic,
where the unchecked spread of COVID-19 within states has caused various
economic shutdowns that have had an enormous effect on interstate
commerce.209
The goal of the amendment is simple, to provide a legally authorized and
transparent method for the federal government to assist state digital contact
tracing efforts. While heavily inspired by the South Korean IDCPA, the
amendment seeks to provide key protections for individual privacy which are
lacking in the IDCPA.210 Subsection (e) of the proposed amendment, which
gives the CDC the ability to request location information from
telecommunications companies, is a direct correlate to article 76-2(2) of the
IDCPA.211 Under the IDCPA, the KCDC requests the location information
from the police, an important step that this amendment purposefully omits in
order to protect privacy and address concerns over unrestricted police access
to location data.212

the Commerce Clause); Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, supra note 41 (“The
federal government derives its authority for isolation and quarantine from the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.”).
208
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (holding that intrastate and non-commercial
activities are subject to the Commerce Clause if they have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce).
209
See Rosie Perper et al., More than Half of the US Population is Now Under Orders to
Stay Home – Here’s a List of Coronavirus Lockdowns in US States and Cities, BUS. INSIDER
(Mar. 31, 2020, 11:57 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/states-cities-shutting-downbars-restaurants-concerts-curfew-2020-3 (reporting on nation-wide shut down orders); see
also Coronavirus: US Economy Sees Sharpest Contraction in Decades, BBC NEWS (July 30,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53574953 (“The US economy shrank at a 32.9%
annual rate between April and June as the country grappled with lockdowns and spending
cutbacks during the pandemic.”).
210
See Yasheng Huang et al., How Digital Contact Tracing Slowed Covid-19 in East Asia,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/how-digital-contact-tracingslowed-covid-19-in-east-asia (“There is likely a fundamental conflict between [East Asia’s
technocratic approach] and deeply entrenched Western liberal values, such as the
expectation of privacy, consent, and the sanctity of individual rights.”).
211
See Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, supra note 117, art. 76-2(2)
(discussing the need for location information to prevent the transmission of disease).
212
Id.; see also DANIEL KAHN GILLMOR, PRINCIPLES FOR TECHNOLOGY-ASSISTED CONTACTTRACING (2020). (“[T]here should be legal, procedural, and technical safeguards to prevent
law enforcement agencies from accessing [location data], combined with mechanisms to
detect such access, and clear, enforceable penalties for doing so.”). Under subsection (h) of
the proposed amendment, the police would constitute an “involved party” subject to civil
liability for the purposeful or knowingly unlawful receipt of any location data under this
amendment.
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Subsection (e) also provides a narrower scope than existing law regarding
federal quarantine.213 The federal power here is limited to the duration of a
national state of emergency in response to a communicable disease.214
Additionally, de-identifying the location data provides further privacy
protections for individuals, unlike the IDCPA, which allows for the
synthetization of multiple types of personal information and no mandate to
de-identify it.215
Under subsection (f) of the proposed amendment, the CDC gains the
ability to share this de-identified location data with State Departments of
Health, drawing on article 76-2(3) of the IDCPA.216 Subsection (f) also
provides substantial limits on both the federal and state government’s ability
to use or share the location data with other parties, which are strengthened by
the need for the State Department of Health to have the telecommunications
companies re-identify the data. The telecommunication companies are also
limited to re-identifying the data only for the State Department of Health’s
use in digital contact tracing. States are further incentivized to oblige by their
statutory duty by a threatened loss of new funding designed to pass
constitutional muster.217 With public health resources already scarce, federal

213

42 C.F.R. § 70.6(a) (2017).
See supra Section IV.B (“The Surgeon General, with the approval of the Secretary,
during a national state of emergency declared in response to an outbreak of a communicable
disease as specified by executive order of the President pursuant to section (b), may instruct
the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention …”).
215
GILLMOR, supra note 212, at 6.
216
See Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, supra note 117, art. 76-2(3)
(discussing the Minister of Health and Welfare’s ability to provide information to the heads
of agencies).
217
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-207 (1987) (“Congress may attach
conditions on the receipt of federal funds …[but] it must do so unambiguously, enabling the
States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation; and that conditions on federal grants must be related to a national concern…”).
Dole’s holding is limited in the sense that conditional funding may not be used to impose
substantial new conditions—that change the nature of previous conditioned funds—on
existing funding; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012)
(“Congress may offer the States grants and require the States to comply with accompanying
conditions, but the States must have a genuine choice whether to accept the offer. The States
are given no such choice in this case: They must either accept a basic change in Medicaid, or
risk losing all Medicaid funding.”). Since previous funding is not at issue, Dole controls
here.
214
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funding in exchange for compliance will be an irresistible carrot dangling
from the federal stick.218
Subsection (f) also provides a statutory requirement of notice to the
individual whose location data is used, mirroring article 76-2(5) of the
IDCPA while omitting the publicization requirement found under article 342, which led to the area wide text-blasts with personal information.219
Requiring states to delete data after its use ensures that data minimization is
maintained after the data has left the federal government’s hands.220
The issue of data being “accidentally” kept in federal servers is addressed
under subsection (g) and is in direct response to concerns arising from the
discovery that South Korea had kept patient data from the 2015 MERS
outbreak.221 Additionally, the provision adds a clear end date to prevent a
perpetual emergency paradox and creates a schedule for the regular
destruction of the data so that only the data that is most relevant to the
epidemiological event is accessible, another limitation not found in the
IDCPA.222
Possibly the greatest incentive for all parties to oblige by their statutory
duties under the proposed amendment is the imposition of civil remedies
under subsection (h). The goal of such a provision is to not only encourage
compliance with a perennial “big brother”—here taking the form of the U.S.
population rather than the government—but also to provide peace of mind
and a viable remedy for each and every person whose personal data may be
used for public health.
Finally, the proposed amendment provides an express preemption
provision. Individual states, especially in the wake of the pandemic, may be
quick to propose laws more stringent than baseline federal privacy laws such

218
See Dan Goldberg & Alice M. Ollstein, A Dangerous New Chapter of the Outbreak:
Every State for Itself, POLITICO (July 14, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/14/states-look-to-trump-for-a-national-plan-tofight-coronavirus-361906 (“Cash-strapped cities and states trying to create their own testing,
tracing and public awareness [programs] from scratch are desperate for federal support...
‘The federal government’s efforts range from a little bit of backup to not even being
present.’”).
219
Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, supra note 117, art. 76-2(5), 34-2; see
also Zastrow, supra note 156 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of collecting
location data).
220
GILLMOR, supra note 212, at 8.
221
All Things Considered, South Korea Admits Keeping Personal Data of 2015 MERS
Outbreak Patients, NPR, (June 23, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/23/882481377/south-korea-admits-keeping-personal-data-of2015-mers-outbreak-patients.
222
Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, supra note 117, art. 76-2(4).
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as HIPAA.223 One example is the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018,
which gives consumers in the state of California the right to request that
certain businesses delete any information collected about the consumer.224
While states were relatively slow to adopt digital contact tracing during the
COVID-19 pandemic, future efforts may be further hindered by state privacy
laws.225 The inclusion of an express preemption provision is based on the
necessity to circumvent these protections in limited times of dire need in the
name of public health.226
VI. CONCLUSION
Mere months before the SARS-CoV-2 virus was discovered, the U.S. was
thought best prepared to respond to an outbreak of a highly infectious
disease.227 However, with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the country
failed to take the steps needed to mitigate the spread of the virus.228 In the
future, the U.S. cannot rely on haphazard mitigation measures until a viable
223

See Health Privacy: HIPAA Basics, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (2015),
https://privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/health-privacy-hipaa-basics (discussing the basics
of HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, “a federal law that
provides baseline privacy and security standards for medical information”); see Paige Smith
& Chris Marr, As Offices Reopen, State Laws Thread Worker Privacy and Safety, BL (July
21, 2021, 4:11 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/as-offices-reopenstate-laws-thread-worker-privacy-and-safety (detailing state laws protecting worker privacy
during the pandemic); see also Jake Holland, State Privacy Bills Reemerge as Momentum
Grows Nationwide, BL (Feb. 16, 2021, 4:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacyand-data-security/state-privacy-bills-reemerge-as-momentum-grows-nationwide (“State
privacy legislation is likely to get a boost from the public’s heightened interest in privacy
due to the pandemic. . . .The pandemic has spurred the public’s interest in privacy, and that
could translate into more momentum at the state and federal levels. . . .”).
224
Digital Contact Tracing and Data Protection Law, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46542.pdf.
225
Zarei, supra note 105, at 3.
226
The preemption provision is primarily concerned with preempting conflicting state laws.
Other laws, such as the HIPAA Privacy Rule, already allow certain disclosures that would
encompass the provisions of this amendment. The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows covered
entities to disclose protected health information (which can include information about
location) “to public health authorities authorized by law to collect or receive such
information for preventing or controlling disease, injury, or disability to public health.”
Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html (last
reviewed July 26, 2013).
227
GLOB. HEALTH SEC. INDEX, supra note 3, at 20.
228
Ed Yong, How the Pandemic Defeated America, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/coronavirus-americanfailure/614191/.
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vaccine is produced, especially given the prevalence of vaccine hesitancy
spurred by misinformation.229 Since the next “once in a century” pandemic
is likely right around the corner, the U.S. should use the COVID-19 pandemic
as an opportunity to reflect on and improve the existing legal paradigms that
shape pandemic response.230
South Korea is the perfect role model.231 After the MERS outbreak in
2015, South Korean legislators radically changed their laws, clarifying the
federal government’s role in pandemic response and enabling the federal
government to better support the state and local governments implementing
public health interventions.232 The U.S. must follow suit and bring public
229
Michael Daly et al., Public Trust and Willingness to Vaccinate Against COVID-19 in the
US From October 14, 2020, to March 29, 2021, 325 JAMA 2397 (2021) (detailing how
despite a decrease in vaccine hesitancy to start 2021, “estimates of vaccine hesitancy
remained high, especially among young adults”); see Sahil Loomba et al., Measuring the
Impact of COVID-19 Vaccine Misinformation on Vaccination Intent In the UK and USA, 5
NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 337 (2021) (describing how “exposure to misinformation lowers
individuals’ intent to vaccinate … and lowers their altruistic intent to vaccinate to protect
others). The threat of vaccine misinformation is demonstrably worse in the digital age. Highprofile skeptics like Tucker Carlson reach millions of viewers daily with selectively picked
phrases and statistics that cast fear, uncertainty, and doubt on vaccine efficacy or the purpose
of vaccination campaigns. See Gilad Edelman, Let’s Keep the Vaccine Misinformation
Problem In Perspective, WIRED (July 28, 2021, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/lets-keep-vaccine-misinformation-problem-in-perspective/
(explaining how skeptics like Tucker Carlson “skirt the scientific question entirely in favor
of ranting about how the government’s vaccine push is really about social control”); see
Olga Khazan, The Tucker Carlson Fans Who Got Vaxxed, ATLANTIC (Aug. 9, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/08/why-so-many-republicans-wont-getvaccinated/619659/ (detailing some of the misleading information that Carlson has spread on
his show, such as the idea that “[Congressional] [m]embers and staffers would be required to
get a shot that the CDC told us [] doesn’t work very well, and … whose long-term effects
cannot be known” despite the CDC never making such a statement). For an interesting
investigation into how conservative YouTube channels—such as Steven Crowder’s ‘Louder
with Crowder,’ and PragerU—may have substantially increased the spread of COVID-19
misinformation and decreased trust in public health experts (which is associated with
vaccine hesitancy), see Michael J. Layer, Conservative Media’s Coverage of Coronavirus on
YouTube: A Qualitative Analysis of Media Effects on Consumers (2020) (M.A. dissertation,
University of South Carolina) (on file with University Libraries, University of South
Carolina) (studying the role of conservative new media, such as YouTube, in “shifting []
audience’s attention” away from public health and science and “toward external enemies,
fueled by division and contempt”).
230
David Murdoch, The Next Once-a-Century Pandemic is Coming Sooner Than You Think
– But COVID-19 Can Help Us Get Ready, CONVERSATION (June 14, 2020, 3:56 PM),
https://theconversation.com/the-next-once-a-century-pandemic-is-coming-sooner-than-youthink-but-covid-19-can-help-us-get-ready-139976.
231
Landman, supra note 28.
232
Id.; See also Mark Ryan, In Defence of Digital Contact-Tracing: Human Rights, South
Korea and Covid-19, 16 INT’L J. PERVASIVE COMPUTING AND COMMC’NS. 383, 384 (2020)
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health response into the digital age. If the government is to use location data
at all, it must be strictly monitored and controlled.233 The amendment to the
Public Health Service Act that this article proposes would do just that,
creating a highly controlled, centralized system designed to supplement state
contact tracing efforts. If future diseases spread with the same rapidity as
COVID-19 and its subsequent variants, manual contact tracing as it stands
will likely be unable to scale at the necessary pace.234 Digital supplements
(being significantly more scalable) can help identify “contacts that are
otherwise untraceable manually, such as encounters with strangers in public
transport or a coffee shop.”235 While digital contact tracing “is not a
panacea,” it can fill a necessary complementary role in our public health
A role-clarifying, top-down system that utilizes the
response.236
technological tools available to maximize public health response would
provide the U.S. federal government with an effective framework to support
its state and local governments, protect individual privacy, and most
importantly, save lives.
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Location data is already being used behind closed doors, without general oversight. See
Kim Lyons, US Government Officials Using Mobile Ad Location Data to Study Coronavirus
Spread, VERGE (Mar. 29, 2020, 8:57 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/29/21198158/us-government-mobile-ad-location-datacoronavirus (“US government officials are using cellphone location data from the mobile ad
industry—not data from the carriers themselves—to track Americans’ movements during the
coronavirus outbreak, the Wall Street Journal reports.”). If location is to be used to augment
public health response, any procedures must provide proper safeguards and remedies. The
amendment offered by this article is one step in that direction.
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